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I. INTRODUCTION
Eric Posner has written a thoughtful and provocative indictment of the
modem economic analysis of contracts. His essay makes two central claims
about the failings of scholars "to produce an 'economic theory.'
1
Specifically, Posner claims that the economic approach "does not explain
the current system of contract law" and that it does not "provide a solid
basis for criticizing and reforming contract law."2 In other words, Posner
claims that modem scholarship fails as either a descriptive or a normative
theory, in that it fails to give an account of what current law is or what
efficient law should be.
The descriptive criticism deserves only brief comment. Although he
claims that modem scholarship has failed to achieve "what its proponents
set out as the measure of success, ' 3 Posner sadly distorts reality by claiming
that the leading scholars have been engaged in an attempt to use economic
theory to predict the content of current legal rules. This is a straw man. Of
course, decades ago this was the project of Richard Posner. 4 But the thought
that efficiency analysis would provide a mechanism to predict the details of
current doctrine is a serious misreading of the aims of modem scholarship.
t William K. Townsend Professor, Yale Law School, ian.ayres@yale.edu. Alan Schwartz
provided helpful comments.
1. Eric A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Contract Law After Three Decades: Success or
Failure?, 112 YALE L.J. 829, 830 (2003).
2. Id.
3. Id. at 879; see also id, at 831 ("[Tjhe original aspiration[] of the economic analysis of
contract law [was] to provide an explanation of existing legal rules ....").
4. See RiCHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (3d ed. 1986).
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Posner himself concedes that Steven Shavell, Charles Goetz, Robert Scott,
Alan Schwartz, Richard Epstein, Alan Sykes, Michelle White, Richard
Craswell, Avery Katz, Eric Rasmusen, and I have not been engaged in
using efficiency analysis to predict the content of current law. 5 Posner's
essay would be much stronger if he jettisoned the descriptive criticism.
Posner's normative claim that modem scholarship fails "to provide a
basis for criticizing or defending those rules"'6 is much more troublesome
and deserves a more extended comment. Posner argues that the economic
models are either too simple or too complex to yield persuasive advice
about what the law should be. The simple models "examine only one or two
margins of contractual behavior"7 and hence are not well suited to assess
whether overall efficiency would be achieved by a particular rule. And
because the more complex models "examine a greater variety of behavior,
or because they rely on more complicated ideas, such as information
asymmetry... [they] often... fail because they are indeterminate." 8 The
more realistic models often suggest that the optimal content of contract law
will turn on details of the underlying environment that will be difficult for
lawmakers to ascertain.
This normative critique is an important concern. Instead of pursuing the
descriptive claim, the coterie of modem contract scholars has aspired to
assess the efficiency of alternative contract rules. And regardless of the
scholars' intent, scholarship that fails to provide a perspective that would
aid in the normative enterprise would be ultimately unsuccessful.
This normative critique is also related to Posner's suggestion that
modem economic analysis of contract law seems to have run its course. He
is "skeptic[al] about how much additional value [it] has to offer to
understanding contract law today."9 Let's call this the evolutionary critique.
The idea that economic analysis has intellectually painted itself into a
corner parallels analogous claims made about game theory more
generally-that the models are either too reductive or too indeterminate to
be of practical normative value.'0 An unmistakable tone of pessimism
pervades Posner's prose.
I concede that much of the modern scholarship is either based on
reductive models or yields normative results that are contingent on
particular parameter values of the underlying environment. But I see much
more normative value in the contributions of the last two decades. Maybe
5. Posner, supra note 1, at 852 ("The charge of descriptive failure will not surprise scholars
familiar with the literature on economic analysis of contract law.").
6. Id. at 831.
7. Id. at 853.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 830.
10. Franklin M. Fisher, Games Economists Play: A Noncooperative View, 20 RAND J. ECON.
113 (1989).
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the largest contribution is in destabilizing false confidence in prior analysis.
If prior consensus holds that default rules should simply be set to provide
the substantive provision that most contractors want, then a reductive model
that simply provides a counterexample can represent an important
contribution. Economists become famous for proving "impossibility
theorems,"11 but "possibility" theorems are also valuable.
A lot turns then on what constitutes "a basis for criticizing or
defending" contract rules.'" Modem scholarship has succeeded in
supplanting unsupportable beliefs with a more supportable agnosticism. If
prior consensus wrongly holds that a particular contractual rule worked
across the broad range of contractual settings, then an article that shows that
the efficiency of the rule's operation is affected by some underlying
bargaining parameter is important whether or not lawmakers can easily
assess the size of the crucial parameter. Showing that prior beliefs were
overly determinate constitutes a basis for criticism. It is slightly ironic that
Posner, in what is essentially a "trashing" piece, refuses to see the value of
"trashing" itself.
13
If agnosticism were the only contribution of the modem scholarship, it
would be reasonable to worry that the field would quickly paint itself into a
comer. But Posner himself concedes:
[E]ven if economic models cannot generate a determinate optimal
contract law, they helpfully identify the costs and benefits of
different legal rules .... [E]ven if economic analysis cannot
determine the magnitude of these costs and benefits, and the extent
to which they offset or interact with each other, the judge who
knows about them is more likely to make a wise decision than a
judge who does not.'
4
Posner, however, immediately rejects the qualitative value that the
models might have for lawmakers:
This defense has an air of plausibility but also distressingly
open-ended and unambitious implications. The last decade has
witnessed a piling on of relevant factors, but no increasing clarity
about the function of contract law, and a wise judge might, in order
11. See KENNETH J. ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES (1951); Omri Ben-
Shahar, The Tentative Case Against Flexibility in Commercial Law, 66 U. CHI. L. REv. 781
(1999); Steven Shavell, Strict Liability Versus Negligence, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1980).
12. Posner, supra note 1, at 831.
13. See Mark G. Kelman, Trashing, 36 STAN. L. REV. 293 (1984).
14. Posner, supra note 1, at 854-55.
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to avoid paralysis, simply ignore them. But the scholarship itself is
mute about its own weaknesses.'
5
It is here that Posner and I part company. First, the scholarship has not
been mute about either the indeterminacy concern or the "piling on" of
factors.' 6 For example, Rob Gertner and I have shown in a simple model
that an optimal legal rule can turn on subtle differences in the parties' costs
of contracting, and we expressly acknowledge that "[w]hen the parties'
knowledge is not symmetric... choosing the efficient contract rule can
entail an extraordinarily complex analysis-which depends on subtle pieces
of information that lawmakers are unlikely to know." t7
But more importantly, Posner's disavowal of qualitative value turns on
a quasi-empirical assessment that there has been no increasing clarity about
which factors should dominate. I disagree. In particular settings, lawmakers
can reasonably conclude that one or another problem (such as promisee
overreliance or promisor ignorance) is the most salient. Using the insights
of modem scholarship, they can fashion with greater clarity laws that
further their consequential objectives. But our disagreement is largely an
empirical one, and the proof is in the pudding. So let me turn to my take on
the more particularized successes of the modem economic analysis of
contract.
15. Id.
16. See Ian Ayres & Kristin Madison, Threatening Inefficient Performance of Injunctions and
Contracts, 148 U. PA. L. REv. 45, 56 (1999) ("[l]t is nigh-on impossible to construct a single
damage rule that will induce efficient behavior along all possible dimensions .... ); id. at 87
("[L]aw and economics scholars in the last decade have found it increasingly difficult to conjure a
single damage measure that induces both sides to behave efficiently on a variety of
dimensions ...."); id. at 91 (discussing twelve different efficiency effects caused by a policy that
deters threats of inefficient performance).
17. Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Strategic Contractual Inefficiency and the Optimal Choice
of Legal Rules, 101 YALE L.J. 729, 765-66 (1991). In our article, we identify six different legal
regimes (including both default and mandatory rules) that would be optimal for alternative values
of particular underlying transaction cost parameters. Id. at 751-59.
Bruce Ackerman (foreshadowing Posner's claim) told me that after reading this article
lawmakers should feel liberated from the constraint of pursuing efficiency. We went on to
emphasize, however:
This practical indeterminacy of our model should not .. be taken to undermine the
appropriateness of either economic modeling or the goal of choosing efficient legal
rules. Our model suggests that the task of pursuing any other normative theory of social
welfare will be just as complex, and therefore will encounter similar forms of
indeterminacy.
Id. at 765-66. It is important to distinguish two types of indeterminacy. Alan Schwartz has
persuasively argued that the courts should not imply contractual terms that are contingent on
unverifiable terms because courts by assumption will not be able to determine whether in fact the
contingency has occurred. See Alan Schwartz, The Default Rule Paradigm and the Limits of
Contract Law, 3 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 389, 404-06 (1993). However, even after restricting
one's attention to default provisions that are contingent upon verifiable information, the choice of
the optimal default can be indeterminate, because the choice of rule itself may depend on factors
(such as the cost of contracting) that a court may have difficulty observing or verifying.
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II. SOME LESSONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
I claim, counter to Posner, that modem scholarship has produced
important normative results--clarifying when contract rules should be
mandatory, illuminating a richer theory of default rule choice, and
underscoring the importance of renegotiation.
A. Making Visible the Default/Mandatory Rule Dichotomy
There is a certain tyranny of time. A scholar's outlook is in some way
irrevocably set by the period in which he or she comes of age. Posner came
of age when the first wave of game theory and informational economics had
already taken hold with its "piling on" of factors. But I came of age in an
earlier time.' 8 Professors did not teach whether particular rules could be
contracted around,19 and most scholarship did not distinguish between
optimal default rule setting and optimal setting of mandatory rules.20
Although Karl Llewellyn had long ago discussed the difference between
"iron" (i.e., mandatory) and "yielding" (i.e., default) rules, 21 and even
though the Uniform Commercial Code and the various editions of the
Restatement of Contracts at times included the telltale phrase "unless
otherwise agreed," 22 there was not a general recognition in the classroom or
in scholarship that the contractibility vel non of a particular rule is often
more important than the content of the rule itself. John Langbein tells me
that when writing in 1984 about the law of succession, he had to retreat to
the little-known Roman law distinction between jus strictum and jus
dispositivum to capture whether laws "override or yield to the contrary
intentions of the parties."2 3 Until the late 1980s, we simply lacked a
18. Posner defines the modem cra as having begun about thirty years ago. Posner, supra note
1, at 829. I've been on the scene about half that period-arriving largely after the seminal
contributions of Goetz and Scott, Robert Cooter, Craswell, Schwartz, Shavell, Anthony Kronman,
and Thomas Ulen (although these authors still continue to contribute).
19. See Ian Ayres, Empire or Residue: Competing Visions of the Contractual Canon, 26 FLA.
ST. U. L. REV. 897, 910 (1999); Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete
Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 130 (1989).
20. Indeed, many law-and-economics scholars simply modeled contractual problems as they
had tort problems: They tried to discover what rule would maximize the efficiency of a
homogenous set of contractors and then argued that this was the efficient rule of law. Of course,
without any heterogeneity of contractors, there was not any room in their models for default
analysis, because there could be no dispersion in equilibrium contract terms.
2 1. See generally Alan Schwartz, Karl Llewellyn and the Origins of Contract Theory, in THE
JURISPRUDENTIAL FOUNDATIONS OF CORPORATE AND COMMERCIAL LAW 12, 15-19 (Jody S.
Kraus & Steven D. Walt eds., 2000).
22. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-319 (1995); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 302 (1990).
23. John H. Langbein, The Nonprobate Revolution and the Future of the Law of Succession,
97 HARV. L. REV. 1108, 1134 (1984).
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common vocabulary-in part because the academy largely
underappreciated the importance of the distinction.
All this has changed.24 It has become almost impossible to write a
contract article without expressly articulating the default/mandatory
dimension of the problem. It is impossible to ignore contractibility in
choosing the content of the rule because we now know that the optimal
substance for a rule will often be different for rules that are contractible
than for those that are not.2 ' And contra to Posner, this revolution has
reached out into express lawmaking. For example, the new Uniform Trust
Code law expressly and exhaustively attempts to compile all the mandatory
rules in an initial section. 26 This extremely helpful undertaking was not a
priority in the past.
27
But more than just making the default/mandatory dichotomy more
visible, the default revolution has clarified when mandatory rules are and
are not appropriate and has enhanced lawmakers' tool bag for creatively
setting defaults.
1. Contributions to Analysis of Mandatory Rules
From early on, there was basic agreement that mandatory restrictions
on freedom of contract could only be justified by efforts to protect parties
inside the contract (parentalism) or parties outside the contract
(externalities).2 8 Important disagreements remained as to the appropriate
scope of these "exceptions." But here Posner argues for an exceptionally
narrow conception of when mandatory rules might be appropriate:
The premises of economics push in the direction of freedom of
contract, and this current can be resisted only with difficulty. If
parties are rational, they will enter contracts only when it is in their
self-interest, and they will agree only to terms that make them
better off. Courts that refused to enforce these terms would make it
24. Dating the change is made easier by its connection to the personal computing revolution.
The term "default" almost certainly has a software etymology-for example, a default margin of
one inch. Indeed, it may be that the mutability of computer codes illuminated the centrality of
mutability for legal codes. See Ian Ayres & Matthew Funk, Marketing Privacy, 20 YALE J. ON
REG. (forthcoming 2003) (arguing that the value of "eyeballs" for Internet advertising made more
visible the value of compensating households for telemarketing advertisements); Lawrence
Lessig, The Law of the Horse: What Cyberlaw Might Teach, 113 HARV. L. REV. 501, 505-06
(1999).
25. See Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Majoritarian vs. Minoritarian Defaults, 51 STAN. L.
REV. 1591 (1999).
26. UNIF. TRUST CODE § 105(b) (2001); see also John H. Langbein, The Uniform Trust
Code: Codification of the Law of Trusts in the United States, 15 TR. L. INT'L 66, 76 (2001).
27. Prior to its 2001 revision, the UCC attempted to establish that by default its provisions
would be contractible-a default default, so to speak. See U.C.C. § 1-102(3) (1995) ("[T]he effect
of provisions of this Act may be varied by agreement except as otherwise provided .....
28. See Ayres & Gertner, supra note 19, at 88.
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more difficult for future parties to use contracts to enhance their
joint well-being. Therefore, courts should enforce the terms of the
contract.
29
The foregoing quote refers to the "premises of economics," but nothing
in economics can define what beginning premises or assumptions are
empirically reasonable. Posner's strong presumption against the use of
mandatory rules relies not on economic analysis but instead on empirical
assumptions about the limited capacities of lawmakers. While I, like most
contracts scholars, believe that the bulk of contract rules should be
contractible, I am more sanguine about the capacity of courts or
legislatures. For example, look at how Posner rejects mandatory limits
based on substantively unfair terms:
[E]conomists typically argue that courts should not avoid contracts
because of the unequal bargaining power of the parties. When
contracts appear to have very high price terms, a court could
determine only with great difficulty whether the high price is due to
market power or fluctuations in the costs of inputs. A high interest
rate, for example, could result from the creditor's judgment about
the risk of default posed by a particular debtor, and generally courts
should defer to such judgments. A determination that the creditor
has market power requires an evaluation of the structure of the
market, a notoriously difficult enterprise usually reserved for
antitrust litigation.
30
But economists have routinely opined on whether high prices were
driven by costs or revenues. For example, Nobel Prize-winning economist
George Stigler in 1968 had no trouble concluding that the variation in
negotiated car prices could not plausibly be explained by differences in a
dealership's expected cost.3' And my own automotive empiricism suggests
the existence of substantial supracompetitive pricing. For example, Mark
Cohen and I, in analyzing data concerning car loans made by Nissan Motor
Acceptance Corporation (NMAC), found that ten percent of NMAC
borrowers paid more than a $1600 markup on their car loans above the risk-
29. Posner, supra note 1, at 842.
30. Jd. at 843.
31. George Stigler rejected the possibility that the observed price dispersion in car sales could
be attributed to cost-based differences in the provision of service. He concluded, "[I]t would be
metaphysical, and fruitless, to assert that all dispersion is due to heterogeneity." GEORGE J.
STIGLER, THE ORGANIZATION OF INDUSTRY 172 (1968).
32. See IAN AYRES, PERVASIVE PREJUDICE (2001).
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adjusted "buy rate" set by the lender.33 A court should have no difficulty
seeing such practices as a form of price gouging.34
But stepping back, it is truly bizarre that Posner would include this
argument as part of a criticism of modem economic analysis. The last
twenty years have seen a flourishing of new explanations for mandatory
rules. The willingness of courts to strike down overreaching contracts is not
inconsistent with the modem scholarship, but with premodern laissez-faire
arguments of the Chicago School to which the modem scholarship was
reacting in large part.
Indeed, Posner himself has contributed a truly original new justification
for a mandatory limitation on unfair price. 35 He suggested that usury laws
might be socially valuable not despite the fact that they make it harder for
poor people to get credit, but because they make it harder for poor people to
get credit. Posner suggested the possibility of a new externality argument
for usury laws. If poor people who default are likely to impose external
costs on society-such as going on public assistance-it might be in
society's interest to constrain the incentives of the poor to overuse the
safety net. Usury laws then might constrain a kind of moral hazard of the
poor to avail themselves of social insurance. I view this article as raising
just the kind of interesting normative possibility that falls within the center
of the modern movement. In the first draft of the essay to which I am
responding, Posner concluded that the modem models "do not justify
striking down contracts with harsh terms when there is no evidence of fraud
or serious information asymmetry." 36 But Posner's own externality model
provides an exception that is nowhere cited in his broad indictment of
recent scholarship.
More generally, the new scholarship has identified new strategic
inefficiencies that might be ameliorated by mandatory rules. These
contributions are merely "possibility theorems," but they have deepened our
understanding of both externalities and parentalism as grounds for limiting
contractual freedom. For example, Kathryn Spier and Michael Whinston
have expanded the externality rationale for mandatory rules by showing that
33. Ian Ayres & Mark Cohen, Supplemental Report on Racial Impact of NMAC's Finance
Charge Markup Policy (Aug. 28, 2001) (unpublished report, on file with author).
34. Unconscionability cases set at the retail level often present an easier case for judging
supracompetitive price terms than antitrust cases set at the manufacturing level because the
transfer price that the retailer pays for the goods (such as a car or a can of peas) more clearly
establishes the marginal cost of the item. See Ian Ayres & F. Clayton Miller, "I'll Sell It to You at
Cost": Legal Methods To Promote Retail Markup Disclosure, 84 Nw. U. L. REV. 1047, 1069
(1990).
35. Eric A. Posner, Contract Law in the Welfare State: A Defense of the Unconscionability
Doctrine, Usury Laws, and Related Limitations on the Freedom To Contract, 24 J. LEGAL STUD.
283 (1995).
36. Eric A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Contract Law After Three Decades: Success or
Failure? 15 (May 7, 2002) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
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supracompensatory damages might be used to improve a seller's bargaining
position vis-A-vis a third party-and that mandatory limits on damages
might increase social welfare.
37
More importantly, Philippe Aghion and Benjamin Hermalin have
provided a stronger economic rationale for basing mandatory rules on a
kind of parentalism to protect parties within the contract from acting
inefficiently. 38 Parentalism restrictions are often driven more by concerns
with equity than efficiency (and hence are more controversial for a certain
type of economist). But Aghion and Hermalin showed that contractual
limits can be justified as a way to stop contracting parties from acting
inefficiently-and thus provide an impeccable new justification even for
those economists who only care about the total size of the pie and not how
it is distributed. The basic idea is that the promisor might agree to pay
supracompensatory damages as a way of signaling that she is of higher
quality than another potential promisor. The problem is that the low-quality
promisor doesn't take this signaling lying down. The low-quality promisor
may be willing to mimic the initial attempts of the high-quality promisors to
distinguish themselves-which in turn causes the high-quality promisors to
offer to be subject to even more draconian punishments if they fail to
perform. In equilibrium, the high-quality promisors may find it rational to
promise massively inefficient damage terms in order to avoid the tarnish of
being lumped together in the promisee's mind with the low-quality
promisors. Aghion and Hennalin showed39 that a legal limit on damages
that forced high- and low-quality promisors to pool could-another
possibility theorem-induce a more efficient equilibrium.
To my mind, this is a pretty neat contribution. Contract law caps
liquidated damages, and Aghion and Hermalin show why this might be
efficient. But Posner is not satisfied: "If we take [the Aghion and Hermalin]
argument seriously, we should apply it not only to remedial terms.
'4 °
Posner argues that potential employees might engage in inefficient
oversignaling regarding how much schooling they receive, so that by
Aghion and Hermalin's logic it might also improve social welfare to restrict
37. Kathryn E. Spier & Michael D. Whinston, On the Efficiency of Privately Stipulated
Damages for Breach of Contract: Entry Barriers, Reliance, and Renegotiation, 26 RAND J.
ECON. 180 (1995); see also Aaron S. Edlin, Breach Remedies, in THE NEW PALGRAVE
DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 174 (Peter Newman ed., 1998).
38. Philippe Aghion & Benjamin Hermalin, Legal Restrictions on Private Contracts Can
Enhance Efficiency, 6 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 381 (1990).
39. Their article builds upon the seminal insurance models in Michael Rothschild & Joseph
Stiglitz, Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets: An Essay on the Economics of Imperfect
Information, 90 QJ. ECON. 629 (1976). The same idea can be found in Ian Ayres, The Possibility
of Inefficient Corporate Contracts, 60 U. CIN. L. REv. 387 (1991) and even earlier in Samuel J.
Rea, Jr., Arm-Breaking, Consumer Credit and Personal Bankruptcy, 22 ECON. INQUIRY 188
(1984).
40. Posner, supra note 1, at 860.
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employers' ability to pay higher wages to more educated workers. This
argument is not persuasive. Not all slopes are equally slippery. Although
inefficient oversignaling can take place in multiple contexts, do we really
need to be agnostic as to whether "pound of flesh" damage provisions and
diploma bonuses are equally likely to be socially inefficient? I hope not.
Legislatures and courts might limit restrictions on contractual freedom to
places where they are most likely to produce undesired consequences. In
short, while law-and-economics scholars often critique the noncontractible
quality of many existing rules, modem scholarship deserves credit for
actually identifying rigorous new bases for mandatory contract law.
2. Contributions to Analysis of Default Rules
Posner's analysis of default rules strikes a similar theme: "The standard
economic analysis of default rules is broadly consistent with judicial
practices; courts employ a mix of majoritarian and penalty defaults. But it
does no more than rationalize these practices, for there is no way to
measure the variables that determine the relative efficiency of the rules."
4 1
He again complains that the normative analysis of default rule setting is not
sufficiently precise to yield determinate policy. I strongly disagree. But
before descending to the muck of particulars, it is important to emphasize
that "the standard economic analysis" that Posner describes did not exist
until fifteen years ago. Prior analysts thought that optimal default rules
should mimic the majority's preferences. Again, I see value in making
visible the possibility of a different basis for default rule setting and for
noticing that, as a descriptive matter, there were information-forcing or
penalty defaults. The modem theory certainly does a better job of
explaining the existing "mix of majoritarian and penalty defaults, 42 because
the preexisting theory had no way of justifying the practice.43
The modem scholarship also has shown that default rule setting can be
extraordinarily important. Twenty years ago, scholars who thought about
default rule setting would tend to say that not much turned on the choice
between alternative defaults because the maximum inefficiency of making
the wrong choice would be the cost of contracting around the inefficient
41. Id. at 841.
42. Id.
43. To be precise, preexisting scholarship did see that contracting around default rules could
induce parties to reveal private information, as shown by Hadley v. Baxendale, 156 Eng. Rep. 145
(Ex. 1854). See POSNER, supra note 4, at 114; William Bishop, The Contract-Tort Boundary and
the Economics of Insurance, 12 J, LEGAL STUD. 241, 253 (1983); Charles J. Goetz & Robert E.
Scott, Enforcing Promises: An Examination of the Basis of Contract, 89 YALE L.J. 1261, 1299-
300 (1980). But the prior scholarship had not seen these possibilities as being in tension with the
accepted "hypothetical" contract approach to default setting (or as providing a broader theory for
default setting).
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rule. We now know this to be wrong. In models with incomplete
information, the efficiency loss of choosing an inefficient rule can greatly
exceed the nominal private costs of contracting around a default. 44 Inertia is
an important determinant of human action, and a central theorem of modem
scholarship is that
[m]ore parties will be covered by a rule if we make that rule a
default than will be covered by that rule if we make a different rule
the default.... The number ofpeople who fail to contract around a
given default is always greater than the number of people who
would affirmatively contract for the substantive provision in the
shadow of some other rule. This is the iron law of default inertia.4 5
But let us proceed to particulars: Is Posner correct that "there is no way
to measure the variables that determine the relative efficiency of the
rules"? 46 Certainly not. Lawmakers can and routinely do use penalty
defaults to correct asymmetric ignorance about the law. The contractor who
is a repeat player (e.g., the insurance company, the car dealership, or the
prosecutor as plea bargainer) is much more likely to know the default rule
than the nonrepeat players (e.g., the insured, the car buyer, or the criminal
defendant). All this is to say that the contra proferentum presumption is
often sound, and modem theory clarifies why this is so.
Or let's look at the two most basic contractual terms-price and
quantity. Rob Gertner and I pointed out that the law applied two very
different types of defaults-supplying a "reasonable" price, but a "zero"
quantity in the case of gaps. We suggested that the first more closely
implements a majoritarian rule while the latter more closely implements a
penalty default. Do we really need to be normatively agnostic about the
common law's choice? No. It is much more difficult for courts to supply
majoritarian quantities than majoritarian prices because to determine
quantities courts would need to look at the preferences of the particular
contracting parties, but would only need to assess the market-wide price to
fill a price gap. Parties have an important comparative advantage in filling
the quantity gap relative to filling the price gap, and it is reasonable for the
law to impose a stronger duty to express quantity.
Besides justifying current practice, the factors identified by modem
default analysis provide a credible basis for law reform. For example,
applying the Hadley limitation to lost-profit damages so as to give sellers a
better incentive to disclose when they are about to earn unexpectedly high
profits is likely to produce benefits in both equity and efficiency. Indeed, I
44. Ayres & Gertner, supra note 17, at 762.
45. Ayres & Gertner, supra note 25, at 1598.
46. Posner, supra note 1, at 841.
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have argued that the law should go further and establish a zero dollar
default for lost retail profit damages. If a retailer does not liquidate an
amount denominated as lost profits, it should not be able to claim them in
later litigation.
Again, the modem analysis has enriched lawmakers' tool bag by
identifying a variety of factors that could lead toward utility of
nonmajoritarian rules. 47 Some degree of indeterminacy should be expected
because a major theme of the modem scholarship is that there will often be
a close horse race between alternative defaults.48 But the fact that many
horse races are close does not mean that lawmakers will be unable to
identify the winners in precisely those contests where there is the most at
stake. Asymmetric information problems do not pervasively produce equal
strategic inefficiencies across all contract settings. There is no persuasive
economic reason to suspect that lawmakers will be unable to identify the
circumstances where the problems are the greatest and respond accordingly
with information-forcing rules (or possibly with mandatory rules, which, as
discussed above, can be seen as information-dampening rules that restrict
the ability of contractors to signal information credibly).
B. The Importance of Renegotiation
A second fundamental contribution of the modem economic
scholarship is a more systematic analysis of the impact of renegotiation on
the optimal design of legal rules. A naive Holmesian might think that when
changed circumstances make performance less profitable, a promisor must
confront the dyadic choice of performing or paying damages. But we now
know that the promisor often has not two, but three choices to consider:
performing, paying damages, or renegotiating her way out of the original
performance obligation.49
Appreciating the importance of this renegotiation option has profound
implications for our understanding of how contractors will behave. For
example, imagine that like the Peevyhouses, you have just received a
promise from the Garland Coal company to move back top soil after strip
mining.50 Would you as promisee prefer breech damages of $25,000 or of
$35,000? It's elementary that potential plaintiffs would generally be better
off with higher potential damages. But this is not necessarily the case when
47. See Ayres & Germer, supra note 25, at 1592 (identifying five factors).
48. See Bernard S. Black, Is Corporate Law Trivial?: A Political and Economic Analysis, 84
Nw. U. L. REV. 542, 542-45 (1990) (suggesting that even mandatory rules may have effects only
on equilibrium).
49. See Ayres & Madison, supra note 16, at 106.
50. The details of the case can be found in Judith L. Maute, Peevyhouse v. Garland Coal &
Mining Co. Revisited: The Ballad of Willie and Lucille, 89 Nw. U. L. REV. 1341 (1995).
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we take into account the possibility of renegotiation. If moving the dirt back
is going to cost the coal company $30,000 (but only benefit you by $2000),
then you might be better off with lower damages. Here's why. If damages
are expected to be $35,000, then the- coal company is likely to threaten
performance as a way to negotiate a lower damage amount. The coal
company may in essence say, "If you don't let me out of the deal for
$16,000, I promise you that I will perform the contract-so you can forget
about ever seeing $35,000 in damages. Let me out for $16,000, or I'll
perform." When damages are high, this threat is credible, because if
renegotiations break down, the coal company will prefer performance to
breach. But if the damages are lower, the plaintiff has much stronger
bargaining power during renegotiation. If damages are only $25,000 and the
renegotiations break down, the coal company would prefer to breach and
pay damages-so there is little reason for the promisee to accept less than
$25,000.
Prior analysts (including judges) had seen the possibility of
renegotiation based on threats to perform, 5' but modem analysis has shown
when the threats are more likely to be credible and how performance threats
can turn our normal intuitions about damages on their heads: Plaintiffs can
be made better off by lower damages, while defendants can be made better
off by higher damages.
Appreciating the renegotiation possibility also has overturned
preexisting intuitions about the overreliance problem. The first generation
of economic analysis focused on whether different damage measures would
induce efficient breach decisions. 52 But more modem scholarship has
focused on how contract remedies affect the investments that contractors
make in reliance on the contract. The focus on the efficiency of reliance
decisions instead of on breach decisions is driven in large part by the
possibility of renegotiation. When renegotiation is costless, we know from
the Coase Theorem that promises will be performed only when
performance is efficient regardless of the background legal remedy. When
damages are draconian (d la specific performance), promisors will buy their
way out of their duties to perform. When damages are relatively paltry (A la
51. See N. Ind. Pub. Serv. Co. v. Carbon County Coal Co., 799 F.2d 265, 279 (7th Cir. 1986)
("[B]y offering [the seller] more than contract damages... [the buyer] could induce [the seller] to
discharge the contract and release [the buyer] to buy cheaper coal.... Probably, therefore, [the
seller] is seeking specific performance in order to have bargaining leverage with [the
buyer] ....").
52. See, e.g., Robert L. Birmingham, Breach of Contract, Damage Measures, and Economic
Efficiency, 24 RUTGERS L. REV. 273, 285-86 (1970) (arguing that restitution and reliance damages
encourage efficient breach); Richard Craswell, Contract Remedies, Renegotiation, and the Theory
of Efficient Breach, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 629, 669 (1988); Edlin, supra note 37, at 174; Lewis A.
Kornhauser, An Introduction to the Economic Analysis of Contract Remedies, 57 U. COLO. L.
REV. 683 (1986); Steven Shavell, Damages Measures for Breach of Contract, 11 BELL J. ECON.
466 (1980).
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reliance), promisees will bribe promisors to perform efficiently. As Aaron
Edlin writes in a Palgrave entry that repays careful reading: "[T]he bulk of
the recent literature .. assume[s]... that parties can negotiate costlessly to
an ex post efficient outcome before the breach decision; that way overall
efficiency is determined by the efficiency of ex ante reliance, since ex post
trade is always efficient."
5 3
The first systematic analysis of the reliance decision by Shavell and
Rogerson, dating from the early 1980s, showed that all standard remedies
frequently promote overinvestment in reliance by promisees. 5 4 Cooter and
Eisenberg then showed that restricting expectation damages (to the amount
that would be necessary if the promisee had engaged in efficient reliance)
could solve the overreliance problem and that the common-law mitigation
principle might crudely work to implement an analogous type of
restriction.
55
But in the 1990s, a number of articles suggested that the
overinvestment result could be qualified or reversed by new types of
contracts or new types of investments.16 The problem of overreliance is
caused in essence by the way traditional remedies compensate promisees
for reliance even when performance turns out to be inefficient. If
promisees' reliance investments are effectively insured in the case of
breach, they may not take into account the possibility that marginal reliance
investments are unwarranted by the possibility of nonperformance. But
Edlin and others have shown that it is possible to counteract the implicit
reliance subsidy of promisees by either manipulating the contract
provisions (1) to control the identity of which side is more likely to breach,
or (2) to create intentionally the possibility that the promisor will be able to
hold up the promisee and claim part of the benefit of the promisee's
reliance investments.
5 7
53. Edlin, supra note 37, at 175. Alan Schwartz and Joel Watson have recently shown how
the results of renegotiation models change when we relax the assumption of costless
renegotiation. See ALAN SCHWARTZ & JOEL WATSON, ECONOMIC AND LEGAL ASPECTS OF
COSTLY RECONTRACTING (UCSD Econ. Discussion Paper No. 2000-05, 2000).
54. See William P. Rogerson, Efficient Reliance and Damage Measures for Breach of
Contract, 15 RAND J. ECON. 39, 41 (1984); Shavell, supra note 52, at 472.
55. See Robert Cooter, Unit in Tort, Contract, and Property: The Model of Precaution, 73
CAL. L. REV. 1, 1-2 (1985); Robert Cooter & Melvin Aron Eisenberg, Damages for Breach of
Contract, 73 CAL. L. REV, 1432, 1464 (1985).
56. E.g., Philippe Aghion et al., Renegotiation Design with Unverifiable Information, 62
ECONOMETRICA 257 (1994); Yeon-Koo Che & Tai-Yeong Chung, Contract Damages and
Cooperative Investments, 30 RAND J. EcoN. 84 (1999); Yeon-Koo Che & Donald B. Hausch,
Cooperative Investments and the Value of Contracting, 89 AM. ECON. REV. 125 (1999); Tai-
Yeong Chung, Incomplete Contracts, Specific Investments, and Risk Sharing, 58 REV. ECON.
STUD. 1031 (1991); W. Bentley MacLeod & James M. Malcomson, Investments, Holdup and the
Form of Market Contracts, 83 AM. ECON. REV. 811 (1993).
57. See, e.g., Aaron S. Edlin, Cadillac Contracts and Up-Front Payments: Efficient
Investment Under Expectation Damages, 12 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 98 (1996); Aaron S. Edlin &
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Somewhat surprisingly, the new scholarship has turned a deeply
accepted tenet of the Coase Theorem on its head. Naive Coaseans tend to
think that the original endowment of entitlement should not affect allocative
efficiency. But the modem contract analysis shows that even when
renegotiation is perfect, the initial assignment of rights can importantly
influence the incentives of parties to invest in unverifiable (and therefore
noncontractible) amounts of reliance.58 If a promisee ends up valuing
performance less than the promisor's cost of performance, it must be the
case that at least one of the parties will have an incentive to bribe its way
out of the contract. But prior analysis did not appreciate that the parties' ex
ante agreement could endogenously determine the identity of who would
have to bribe whom and that manipulating the identity of the briber could
have important impacts on the efficient breach.5 9
Moving from the Holmesian dyadic to a triadic view of contractual
performance-where promisors have the choice of performing, breaching,
or negotiating their way out of the contract-pays big dividends. We now
know that in some contexts, a major goal of an initial agreement should be
to set up the appropriate threat points for a subsequent renegotiation.
Stepping back, I believe that this Part's brief survey of contributions is
sufficient to show that modem scholarship has been clarifying. It has
appropriately destabilized misplaced acceptance of prior consensus. And at
times it has suggested specific normative conclusions about the content of
contract law. But to be fair, Posner's normative criticism also includes the
claim of judicial "paralysis"-that judges have reacted to the "distressingly
open-ended" and intricate implications of modem scholarship by "simply
ignor[ing] them.",60  Even if modem scholarship has produced real
normative contributions, Posner might still be correct that the scholarship
has failed because judges and legislators have ignored it.
Posner is right that modern scholarship has not had a large impact on
how judges or legislators decide law. Judges do not cite to the scholarship,
and with very few exceptions they are probably ignorant about its results-
Stephan Reichelstein, Holdups, Standard Breach Remedies and Optimal Investment, 86 AM.
ECON. REV. 478 (1996).
58. The finding of an influence from entitlement assignment on noncontractible investments
does not, however, contradict the Coase Theorem, because the assumption of noncontractibility
with regard to reliance investment is an important form of transactional friction that can produce
allocation effects.
59. In addition, Che and Chung's analysis of "cooperative investments" has enriched our
understanding of an important new type of investment decision that now has to be considered in
any full treatment of reliance efficiency. See Che & Chung, supra note 56; Che & Hausch, supra
note 56. The standard analysis focused on "self-investments"-i.e., seller investments that reduce
the cost of performance or buyer investments that increase the benefit of purchasing. But Che and
Chung pointed out real world examples where sellers might make investments that increase a
buyer's benefit of purchasing or where buyers might make investments that reduce a seller's cost
of performing, thereby showing that standard damage remedies can induce too little reliance.
60. Posner, supra note 1, at 855.
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even ignorant about whether they are promulgating mandatory or default
rules. But here Posner is setting the bar very high. Gentle reader, when was
the last time one of your own articles changed the law? With the exception
of antitrust law,61 there are very few areas of modem jurisprudence where
lawmakers are deeply concerned with the view of modem scholarship. The
disconnect between lawmaking and legal academia is well documented.62
And besides, fifteen or twenty years is simply not enough time to run
this experiment. The current crop of law students is much more likely to
appreciate the centrality of the default/mandatory dimension of lawmaking.
There is now a more common vocabulary. When the next generation comes
to power, we will have a fairer test of whether what is now the "modem"
scholarship fails to persuade.
Once we have a new generation of lawmakers who have been exposed
to the "new" learning, Posner might predict that they will reject the
normative advice as being distressingly open-ended.6 3 But let me be clear. I
have argued that some of the open-endedness is an important contribution
of the new scholarship. Instead of reflexively accepting the almost universal
superiority of default rules, the new scholarship has thrown into question
whether mandatory rules may have a broader role to play. And instead of
reflexively accepting that majoritarian or hypothetical defaults are
presumptively efficient, the new scholarship suggests that other bases for
default choice may better further consequentialist goals. The destabilizing
contributions of modem scholarship usefully advise lawmakers to be
prudent. The fact that modem scholarship does not provide ready answers
to every question, far from scaring judges away, may be an invitation for
judges and other lawmakers to weigh pragmatically a variety of possible
alternatives (and possible effects). This may be the best we can hope for
and is in the end more likely to "conduce to the sweet" than a Panglossian
presumption that (almost) all rules should be defaults and (almost) all
defaults should be majoritarian.64
I, for one, predict that the exhaustive listing of mandatory rules by the
new Uniform Trust Code law-which, by the way, I take as an important
impact of modem scholarship upon the law-is just the beginning of a trend
to develop a more explicit jurisprudence of contractibility. When Posner's
61. William H. Page, The Chicago School and the Evolution of Antitrust: Characterization,
Antitrust Injury, and Evidentiary Sufficiency, 75 VA. L. REV. 1221 (1989). But see Alvin
Klevorick, The Current State of the Law and Economics of Predatory Pricing, 83 AM. ECON.
REV. PAPERS & PROC. 162 (1993) (showing modem scholarship's lack of influence on judicial
decisionmaking).
62. See ANTHONY KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER (1993); Harry T. Edwards, The Growing
Disjunction Between Legal Education and the Legal Profession, 91 MICH. L. REV. 34 (1992).
63. Or we may find that they reject the efficiency advice because they are "captured" by other
interest groups-even those favoring equity.
64. CANDIDE, THE MUSICAL (Sony Records 1991). Pangloss teaches that "all bitter things
conduce to sweet." Id.
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students become judges, they are more likely to emphasize when future
parties retain the ability-by using different words-to overturn a judicial
precedent privately.
III. ONE POSSIBLE FUTURE: OPT-OUT RULES
While the foregoing suffices to show that modem scholarship has to
date made important normative contributions, Posner's evolutionary
critique is harder to disprove. Even if George Bailey has had a wonderful
life up until now, it might nonetheless be the right time for him to cut the
tree.65 Less poetically, it's harder to disprove the claim that modem
economic analysis of contracts has played itself out. But let me try-by
suggesting that there are still very basic questions that have not been
systematically analyzed.
To my mind, there are three basic tasks of contract law: (1) to
determine the substantive content of contract rules, (2) to determine
whether private action can supplant this substance, and (3) to determine
how the private parties can contract around it.66 Let's call these the content
task, the contractibility task, and the opt-out task. We now know a great
deal about the first two tasks. And as emphasized above, a major
contribution of modern scholarship was to show that the content and
contractibility tasks are not separable. The optimal content of a rule is
contingent on whether or not the rule is contractible. Majoritarianism as a
basis for establishing the content makes great sense when one is
determining the content of mandatory rules. I tell my students that this is
how a "tort head" tends to analyze the law-because tort law is primarily a
system of mandatory rules. But we now know that determining the optimal
content of contractible rules requires a consideration of a variety of factors
65. Interestingly, in the movie It's a Wonderful Life, the angel Clarence uses an indirect mode
of persuasion-a counterfactual about the past to convince the protagonist not to cut short his
future life. Bailey might have responded to the angel's argument by saying, "You're right,
Clarence. I'm glad I was born and have lived up until now, but prospectively I think I'm better off
dead." In contrast, Charles Dickens's A Christmas Carol and Nikos Kazantzakis's The Last
Temptation of Christ rely more strongly on direct persuasion revealing to the protagonist what
will happen prospectively if he continues along a certain path.
The reference to "cutting the tree" comes from the classic economic problem of determining
when it is the appropriate time to cut down a tree. For profit maximizers, the answer is when the
market value of the tree starts growing more slowly than the interest rate. High rates of past
growth do not mean that it is inappropriate to cut a tree that is prospectively expected to grow at
an inefficiently slow rate.
66. The last task might alternatively be characterized as determining the legal consequences
of attempting to contract around the substance of the initial rule. This is a broader characterization
because even if the law determines the substance to be not contractible (i.e., mandatory), the law
must still determine the appropriate response to private parties' attempts to contract around the
rule. Courts often apply one of two legal responses, either penalizing one or both parties for
attempting to contract around, or alternatively merely nullifying or ignoring the attempt to
contract around the rule. See Ayres, supra note 19, at 902.
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that have been identified by the modem literature. 6' A "contract head"
needs to think differently than a "tort head."
We still know very little, however, about the opt-out task. While there
now have been not just articles but full symposia focusing exclusively on
whether rules should be mandatory or default (the contractibility task)68 and
how to set defaults (the content task),69 there has been no sustained
theorizing about how law should regulate the process of contracting
around. 70 A strong indication that there is an important gap in the literature
is that we do not even have a well-accepted term for the question to be
studied. Just as we did not have a standardized term for the
mandatory/default dichotomy fifteen years ago, we still do not have
standardized terms for those legal rules that establish the necessary and
sufficient conditions for contracting around. Let me call these legal rules
"opt-out" rules. 71
1 do not think that the economic analysis has played itself out because
there are still very basic unanswered questions about how the law should set
opt-out rules.
Should the law merely try to minimize the transaction cost of
contracting around defaults, or should it also be concerned about the error
costs of misinterpreting potential attempts at opting out? The tension
between these two norms is raised ubiquitously in computer programming
whenever the user is asked a second time, "Do you really want to delete this
file?"
Should the law ever try to discourage (or "tax") opt-out? Instead of
setting either a simple mandatory or default rule, could there be a value to
67. See Barry E Adler, The Questionable Ascent of Hadley v. Baxendale, 51 STAN. L. REV.
1547 (1999); Ayres & Gertner, supra note 25; Randy E. Barnett, The Sound of Silence: Default
Rules and Contractual Consent, 78 VA. L. REV. 821, 822 (1992); Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Steven
Shavell, Information and the Scope of Liability for Breach of Contract: The Rule of Hadley v.
Baxendale, 7 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 284 (1991); Richard Craswell, Contract Law, Default Rules, and
the Philosophy of Promising, 88 MICH. L. REV. 489, 503 (1989); Richard Craswell, Property
Rules and Liability Rules in Unconscionability and Related Doctrines, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 15
n.28 (1993); Jason Scott Johnston, Strategic Bargaining and the Economic Theory of Contract
Default Rules, 100 YALE L.J. 615 (1990).
68. See Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Debate on Contractual Freedom in Corporate Law, 89
COLUM. L. REV. 1395 (1989) (summarizing symposium articles on the topic of mandatory terms
in a corporate law system of default rules).
69. See, e.g., Symposium, Default Rules and Contractual Consent, 3 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J.
1 (1993); sources cited supra note 37.
70. Rob Gertner and I promised to provide such a theory in the second half of our original
Yale article but fell woefully short of delivering on the promise.
71. The term "opt-out" is used more commonly to describe a default rule of potential liability
(where the promisor has to opt out affirmatively to nullify the potential for liability), in
contradistinction to "opt-in" defaults where the promisor has to opt in affirmatively to create the
potential for liability. See, e.g., Robert R. Biggerstaff, State Courts and the Telephone Consumer
Protection Act of 1991: Must States Opt-In? Can States Opt-Out?, 33 CONN. L. REV- 407 (2001);
John A. Buchman, Opt In, Opt Out or Do Noihing-That Is the Question, BUS. L. TODAY, Jan.-
Feb. 1996, at 48.
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having "sticky" defaults 72-not to assure contractors' intents but to
dissuade contractors with only weak preferences from separating out of the
lawmaker's preferred pool?
Should courts as a matter of course tell the losing side in interpretive
contract disputes how it could prospectively alter the contract to reach its
desired result?73 In classic cases like Peevyhouse v. Garland Coal74 and
Jacob and Youngs v. Kent,75 courts reject attempts to opt out of defaults and
uphold the potential for opt out while failing to specify safe harbor
language that would be sufficient.
How should lawmakers optimally deploy statutory and common law
"menus,' '76 "safe harbors," 77 "shibboleths," 78 and "affirmative choice ' '79
conditions?
At the moment there are neither satisfying answers for these questions
nor overarching theories about how to structure opt-out rules. And, indeed,
it is not necessarily true that an economist will provide the answers.8 ° One
thing is clear, however-that this opt-out task of law is not separable from
the content or contractibility tasks. Information-forcing defaults, for
example, are much more likely to need opt-out rules that require the
disclosure of information in order to opt out. And of course we would want
different opt-out rules to govern mandatory rules (where by assumption we
want to discourage opt-out) than for default rules (where we are likely to be
at least neutral as to whether the parties opt out).
IV. CONCLUSION
In sum, Posner has leveled three different criticisms at the modem
economic analysis of contracts: a descriptive critique that the scholarship
72. See Ayres & Gertner, supra note 19, at 125 (discussing the possible channeling function
of such sticky defaults).
73. 1 have argued that the answer to this question is "yes." Ian Ayres, Three Proposals To
Harness Private Information in Contract, 21 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 135 (1997). But in
thinking about the second question, I am in the process of qualifying that answer.
74. 382 P.2d 109 (Okla. 1962); see also supra text accompanying note 50.
75. 129N.E. 889 (N.Y. 1931).
76. The modem literature has suggested that express statutory menus of alternative provisions
may enhance efficiency at times. See Ayres & Gertner, supra note 17.
77. A "safe harbor" opt-out rule is a sufficient condition for opting out. See, e.g., U.C.C.
§ 2-316 (1995) ("[Ulnless the circumstances indicate otherwise, all implied warranties are
excluded by expressions like 'as is' ... ").
78. A "shibboleth" opt-out rule is a necessary condition for opting out. An example is a UCC
provision that comes close to requiring that waivers of the implied warranty of merchantability
use the word "merchantability" and be conspicuous. See U.C.C. § 2-316(2) (1995).
79. An affirmative choice rule is a type of penalty default that forces contractors to make an
affirmative choice in order to create a contract. For example, corporate organizers must
affirmatively choose the number and identity of directors in their articles of incorporation. MODEL
Bus. CORP. ACT § 7.21 (1985).
80. But I hope to try.
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fails to describe or predict the content of current law, a normative critique
that the scholarship fails to "provide a solid basis for criticizing and
reforming contract law," 81 and an implicit evolutionary critique that the
scholarship has run out of things to say. Posner's descriptive critique is
misplaced. Modem scholarship has never been about trying to describe or
predict current law. His normative critique is overblown. While Posner is
correct that much of the modem scholarship is based on stylized models
with results that turn on particular parameter values, he underappreciates
the normative importance of "possibility" theorems. Modem scholarship
has contributed by showing that the accepted determinacy of prior
normative analysis is unsustainable. Moreover, the factors identified by
modem literature have generated affirmative policy proposals (such as
extending the Hadley foreseeability limitation to seller's lost-profit
damages).
But Posner's evolutionary critique may stand on a stronger footing. All
valuable schools of inquiry at some point in time tend to reach diminishing
marginal returns. The economic analysis of tort law, for example, is widely
conceded to have reached a point of "maturity" where it is difficult to find
basic untheorized questions for study. And maybe-despite my arguments
about opt-out rules-the same is taking place, or about to take place, with
regard to the economics of contracts. I join Posner in welcoming and
predicting a shift from the theoretical to the empirical.82
But instead of debating the future, it's better for us to wait and see.
Methodology pieces like this also are subject to the very criticisms that
Posner levels at modem scholarship-they don't predict current law, they
don't provide a basis for critiquing current law, and they quickly play
themselves out.
A few years back, Posner and I participated in a Wisconsin Law Review
symposium comparing economic and sociological approaches to law.
Posner wisely eschewed writing an ungrounded piece on methodology and
instead published what to my mind was the most valuable contribution of
the symposium-an analysis of gratuitous contracts. 83 In contrast, I
dyspeptically complained about the limited value of publishing method
pieces, stating that "I generally believe that ungrounded discussions of
methodology are not useful. I don't 'do' method-or at least I don't do
method well .... Better to have scholars from different disciplines attack a
81. Posner, supra note 1, at 830.
82. A similar shift from the theoretical to the empirical has already occurred with regard to
applied game-theoretic analysis. See, e.g., Douglas W. Allen & Dean Lueck, The Nature of the
Farm, 41 J.L. & ECON. 343, 344 (1998).
83. Eric A. Posner, Altruism, Status, and Trust in the Law of Gifts and Gratuitous Promises,
1997 Wis. L. REV. 567.
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particular problem, and then assess which methodology produces the best
purchase. 84
These are still my beliefs.
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